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Abstract
Twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD), which is immune to all possible detector side
channel attacks, enables two remote legitimate users to perform secure communications without
quantum repeaters. With the help of a central node, TF-QKD is expected to overcome the lin-
ear key-rate constraint using current technologies. However, the security of the former TF-QKD
protocols relies on the hypothesis of infinite-key and stable sources. In this paper, we present
the finite-key analysis of a practical decoy-state twin-field quantum key distribution with variant
statistical fluctuation models. We examine the composable security of the protocol with intensity
fluctuations of unstable sources employing Azuma’s inequality. Our simulation results indicate that
the secret key rate is able to surpass the linear key-rate bound with limited signal pulses and inten-
sity fluctuations. In addition, the effect of intensity fluctuations is extremely significant for small
size of total signals.
I. INTRODUCTION\\
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is
considered to be the most mature application
of quantum information science. Since the
establishment of the first protocol, great ef-
forts have been devoted to develop quantum
key distribution [3, 4]. However, the trans-
∗ wy@qiclab.cn
† bws@qiclab.cn
mission loss of optical pulses, which is an in-
trinsic property of the quantum channels, has
significantly limited the communication dis-
tance between the legitimate users [5, 6].
In order to break the limitation of channel
transmittance, the quantum repeater scheme
was proposed. Unfortunately, quantum re-
peaters are impractical to be implemented
with current quantum communication tech-
nologies [7–9]. On the other side, Lo et
1
al. [10] proposed the measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution (MDI-
QKD) protocol to prevent all possible detec-
tor side channel attacks. Nevertheless, MDI-
QKD cannot remove the bottleneck of long-
distance quantum communication either.
Recently, Lucamarini et al. [11] proposed
the unprecedented twin-field quantum key
distribution (TF-QKD) scheme which was
conjectured to overcome the rate-distance
limit without trusted relays. Based on single-
photon interference at the beamsplitter of
an untrusted node, the secret key rate of
TF-QKD achieved a quadratic improvement
over the traditional phase-encoding scheme
of MDI-QKD [12]. Considering the huge
benefit that the secret key rate scales with
the square-root of the channel transmittance,
several variations of this cutting-edge TF-
QKD protocol have been proposed to offer
a more rigorous security proof [13–20]. Sub-
sequently, experiments related to these vari-
ant protocols were carried out to prove the
feasibility of TF-QKD with current technolo-
gies [21–24]. Nonetheless, there still remains
an inevitable gap between theories and the
practical imperfections. Among these ex-
perimental limitations, finite-size effect is a
nonnegligible character in the estimation of
the ultimate secret key rate [25, 26]. Sev-
eral finite-key analyses have been proposed to
study the practicalities of some TF-QKD pro-
tocols [27, 28]. Another weakness we cannot
neglect is the instability of the photon source.
Instead of the stable source employed in the
original TF-QKD protocol, the real system
always emits photon pulses whose intensities
cannot be asymptotically replaced by a con-
stant value [29–32].
In this work, we focus on the practi-
cal decoy-state [33–35] TF-QKD scheme pro-
posed by Grasselli et al. [36]. The decoy-
state TF-QKD protocol has two main ad-
vantages in real-life implementation: (1) This
TF-QKD protocol is capable enough to beat
the PLOB bound with only two decoy states.
(2) The protocol is quite robust against phase
misalignments due to the phase randomiza-
tion of decoy pulses. We utilize different
statistical fluctuation analysis models [37–
40] to perform the parameter estimation step
of the two decoy states TF-QKD protocol.
Based on the universally composable frame-
work [41–43], we obtain a tight secret key
rate bound with statistical fluctuations. In
the case without intensity fluctuations, we
make a brief comparison of the final secret
key rates estimated by variant statistical fluc-
tuation analysis tools. However, when an-
alyzing the effect of intensity fluctuations,
we noticed that the correlation between two
detection events cannot be ignored. Hense,
we present a tight finite-key analysis utiliz-
ing Azuma’s inequality [44, 45] to prove the
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composable security against general attacks
with the existence of intensity fluctuations.
Through numerical simulations, we investi-
gate the secret key rates of different total sig-
nal pulses with statistical fluctuations and in-
tensity fluctuations. The simulation results
indicate that intensity fluctuations have a
nonnegligible impact on the performance of
the practical decoy-state TF-QKD protocol.
The article is organized as follows. In Sec.
II, we present the practical decoy-state TF-
QKD protocol. In Sec. III, we provide the
parameter estimations of the finite-key anal-
ysis with or without the existence of intensity
fluctuations. In addition, the numerical sim-
ulations are demonstrated in Sec. IV. The
conclusion of our work is presented in Sec.
V.
II. PRACTICAL DECOY STATE TF-
QKD PROTOCOL\\
The twin-field type quantum key distribu-
tion protocol proposed in [17] is able to over-
come the secret key rate bound effectively.
According to the two decoy states method
proposed in [36], we constructed the practical
form of this TF-QKD protocol in finite-key
regime:
(i) State preparation. The two legitimate
users Alice and Bob choose Z-basis (X-basis)
independently with probability PZ (PX = 1 −
PZ). If Z-basis is chosen, Alice (Bob) pre-
pares the signal pulses with her (his) trusted
coherent state source. In this mode, Alice
(Bob) firstly generates a secret key bit bA (bB)
randomly selected from the set bA, bB ∈ {0, 1}.
Then, Alice (Bob) prepares a coherent state
pulse
∣∣√µZeipibA〉 (∣∣√µZeipibB〉) depending on
the bit value bA (bB) with the pre-agreed in-
tensity µZ. On the other side, if X-basis is
chosen, Alice (Bob) prepares the decoy pulse
with a phase-randomized coherent state. The
intensity of the decoy pulse is picked from the
set µA, µB ∈ {µ0, µ1} with probabilities Pµ0 and
Pµ1 = 1− Pµ0 . According to the basic choices,
Alice and Bob send their optical pulses to the
untrusted third-party Charlie through quan-
tum channels.
(ii) Measurement. In this step, Charlie is
supposed to perform an interference mea-
surement with her beamsplitter and record
the outcomes of the two threshold detectors.
Due to the measurement results, Charlie an-
nounces the measurement outcomes of the
two detectors (L and R) through public chan-
nels. The detection events when one and only
one of two detectors clicks are called success-
ful detection events.
(iii) Sifting. After steps i-ii have been re-
peated for N times, both parties acquire ad-
equate successful detection events for key
sifting. Alice and Bob publicly announce
their basic and intensity choices of their opti-
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cal pulses through an authenticated classical
channel. If Alice and Bob have selected the
same basis, they record these events as suc-
cessful detection events sZ (sX) according to
which basis they have chosen.
(iv) Parameter estimation. When both parties
choose Z-basis, they retain their bit values
corresponding to successful detection events
as their raw key bits. Note that Bob always
flips his key bit bB if R detector clicks. Their
raw key strings are denoted as ZA and ZB.
According to the successful detection events
observed in the sifting step, Alice and Bob
can estimate the upper bound of the un-
known phase error rate EZph of their raw key
bits using our parameter estimation methods
provided in Sec. III.
(v) Error correction. In order to obtain an
identical key bit string, Alice and Bob carry
out an information reconciliation scheme.
They sacrifice leakEC bits to perform the er-
ror correction step. After that, Alice con-
sumes log2(1/εcor) bits of her string ZA to per-
form a random two-universal hash function
and sends the hash to Bob. If the hash of
Bob’s string ZB is different from that of ZA,
they abort the protocol.
(vi) Privacy amplification. To ensure that the
information leakage is under control, they ex-
ploit a random two-universal hash function
to their secret key strings to extract a more
private key string with length l.
III. PARAMETER ESTIMATIONS\\
A. Secrecy analysis
To provide a tight finite-key analysis, we
exploit the universally composable frame-
work as the benchmark of our security anal-
ysis [26, 39]. The final key string that Alice
(Bob) obtains after error correction and pri-
vacy amplification is denoted as Z ′A (Z
′
B). Fol-
lowing the definition of composable security,
a QKD protocol can be regarded as ’secure’ if
the two criterions ‘correctness’ and ‘secrecy’
are satisfied. No matter what attacking strat-
egy the eavesdropper Eve employs, the pro-
tocol is εcor-correct if the probability that the
final key Z ′A and Z
′
B are not identical satisfies
Pr[Z ′A 6= Z ′B] ≤ εcor. (1)
The final key is εsec-secret from Eve if
1
2
∥∥ρZ′
A
E − UZ′
A
⊗ ρE
∥∥
1
≤ εsec, (2)
where ρZ′
A
E is the joint quantum state of Al-
ice’s final key Z ′A and Eve, UZ′A is the mixed
state of all possible values of Z ′A. ‖·‖1 de-
notes the trace norm which indicates that the
joint quantum state ρZ′
A
E is εsec-close to the
ideal case described as UZ′
A
⊗ ρE. In this case,
the protocol is called ‘ε-secure’ if it is not
only εcor-correct but also εsec-secret, where
ε ≥ εcor + εsec.
Here we obtain the secret key rate R by de-
riving the private key string length l with the
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decoy-state method provided in [36, 39]. Ac-
cording to the universally composable frame-
work definition [41], we provide the detailed
estimation of the secret key length in Ap-
pendix A. The practical TF-QKD protocol in
the finite-key regime is εsec-secret if the length
l of the final key satisfies:
l ≤ sZ [1−h(EZph)]− leakEC − 2log2
1
2εPA
− log2
2
εcor
,
(3)
where h(x) = −xlog2x − (1 − x)log2(1 − x) is the
binary Shannon entropy function. Note that
leakEC = sZfh
(
EZµ
)
represents the bits we sac-
rifice to perform the error correction step,
where f is the error correction inefficiency.
Subsequently, the secret key rate can be ob-
tained by R = l/N .
B. Finite-key analysis without inten-
sity fluctuations
In our practical TF-QKD protocol, the
successful detection events sZ , sX and the bit
error rate EZµ can be directly observed in real
experiments. Thus the key issue of our finite-
key analysis is the parameter estimation of
the unknown phase error rate EZph. In this
subsection, we demonstrate the derivation of
the upper bound of EZph with the successful
detection events observed in the sifting step.
A tighter security bound is obtained by ap-
plying the random sampling method.
For simplicity, we assume that the lossy
channel is symmetrical for Alice and Bob.
The total number of signal pulses when both
parties choose Z-basis (X-basis) is denoted
as NZ (NX). The successful detection events
corresponding to the X-basis are denoted as
sXAB, the subscripts represent the intensities
µA and µB chosen by Alice and Bob in the
decoy-state preparation step. We notice that
sX =
∑
sXAB is the total amount of successful
detection events in the X-basis. Note that
sXAB can be directly observed in the sifting
step after both parties announced their in-
tensity choices of the decoy pulses.
Here, we denote Snm as the set of success-
ful detection events that Alice (Bob) sends
out n (m) photons in the decoy pulse. We de-
note snm as the total amount of set Snm. The
probability PAB|nm denotes the conditional
probability that Alice (Bob) chooses µA (µB)
as the intensity of the decoy pulse given that
the signal contains n (m) photons. The suc-
cessful detection events sXAB,nm denotes that
Alice (Bob) sends out n (m) photons with the
intensity choice of the decoy pulse being µA
(µB). The eavesdropper Eve cannot change
the values of snm after Charlie made the an-
nouncements. For a set of unknown but fixed
values of snm, we have that
sXAB,nm =
snm∑
i=1
τABi,nm,
sXAB =
∑
n,m
snm∑
i=1
τABi,nm,
(4)
where τABi,nm = 1 with probability PAB|nm and
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otherwise 0. The expectation value of sXAB,nm
with respect to τABi,nm variables can be obtained
by
s∗,XAB,nm = PAB|nm snm. (5)
Subsequently, the expectation value of sXAB is
given by
s∗,XAB =
∑
n,m
s∗,XAB,nm =
∑
n,m
PAB|nm snm. (6)
In this case, Eve cannot change the mean
value of sXAB after Charlie’s announcements.
Thus, the yields and phase error rate esti-
mated by the expectation values of sXAB can-
not be changed either. Let Ynm denote the
yield when Alice (Bob) sends out n (m) pho-
tons. We notice that snm = NXPnPmYnm,
where Pn (Pm) is the probability that Alice
(Bob) sends out n (m) photons in X-basis.
The expectation value s∗,XAB can be rewritten
as
s∗,XAB = PAPB
∑
n,m
Pn|APm|BNXYnm, (7)
where Pn|A = e−µAµAn/n! and Pm|B =
e−µBµBm/m! are the Poisson distributions of
µA and µB.
With the observed values sXAB obtained in
the sifting step, we can calculate the upper
bounds and lower bounds of the expectation
values s∗,XAB with our parameter estimation
method. Then Eq. (7) can be substituted
by the following inequality
s∗,XAB ≤ PAPB
∑
n,m
Pn|APm|BNXYnm ≤ s∗,XAB , (8)
where s∗,XAB (s
∗,X
AB ) is the lower bound (upper
bound) of s∗,XAB .
To find the upper bound of the phase er-
ror rate EZph, one needs to deal the following
issues: (1) The estimation of s∗,XAB and s
∗,X
AB
with the successful detection events sXAB ob-
served in the sifting step. (2) The estimation
of EZph with the decoy-state method and ran-
dom sampling without replacement method.
The first issue can be solved by apply-
ing variant statistical fluctuation models to
the observed values sXAB. We exploit Hoeffd-
ing’s inequality [37], the multiplicative Cher-
noff bound [39] and the improved Chernoff
bound [40] to obtain a tight key-rate bound
in our protocol. Here, we provide the esti-
mation method with the improved Chernoff
bound in the main text. The detailed form
of Hoeffding’s inequality and the multiplica-
tive Chernoff bound can be referred to in Ap-
pendix B.
The improved version of the Chernoff
bound is expressed as follows. Every single
detection event can be regarded as a random
variable in our protocol. Let τ1, τ2, . . . , τn be a
set of n independent Bernoulli random vari-
ables where τi ∈ {0, 1} and Pr (τi = 1) = Pi. Let
τ =
∑n
i=1 τi denote an observed outcome for a
given trial. The mean value of the set is de-
noted by τ∗ =
∑n
i=1 Pi. For a fixed mean value
τ∗, the upper bound and lower bound of the
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observed value τ satisfy:
Pr [τ > (1 + δ) τ∗] <
[
eδ
(1 + δ)
(1+δ)
]τ∗
= g (δ, τ∗) ,
Pr
[
τ <
(
1− δ) τ∗] <

 e−δ(
1− δ)(1−δ)


τ∗
= g
(−δ, τ∗) ,
(9)
where δ > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1) and g (x, y) =[
ex(1 + x)
−(1+x)
]y
. According to the above
equations, we can estimate the upper bound
and lower bound of the observed value with
a fixed expectation value. However, the fixed
expectation value τ∗ mentioned in our finite-
key analysis is unknown. We notice that the
expectation value τ∗ can be bounded by
Pr
[
τ∗ > τ
/(
1− δ)] <

 e−δ(
1− δ)1−δ


τ∗
= g
(−δ, τ∗) ,
Pr [τ∗ < τ/(1 + δ)] <
[
eδ
(1 + δ)
1+δ
]τ∗
= g (δ, τ∗) ,
(10)
where τ∗ = τ
/(
1− δ) and τ∗ = τ/(1 + δ) de-
note the upper bound and lower bound of
the expectation value τ∗. Then the proba-
bilities that τ∗ exceeds the upper bound τ∗
and the lower bound τ∗ can be denoted as
ε = g
(−δ, τ/(1− δ)) and ε = g (δ, τ/(1 + δ)). In
this way, given an observed value τ and fail-
ure probabilities ε and ε, δ and δ can be ob-
tained by solving the following equations

 e−δ(
1− δ)1−δ


τ/(1−δ)
= ε,
[
eδ
(1 + δ)
1+δ
]τ/(1+δ)
= ε.
(11)
Now we can utilize the improved Chernoff
bound to obtain the upper bound s∗,XAB and
lower bound s∗,XAB of the successful detection
events sXAB:
s∗,XAB = s
X
AB
/(
1− δ),
s∗,XAB = s
X
AB
/
(1 + δ).
(12)
where δ and δ can be calculated by

 e−δ(
1− δ)1−δ


sX
AB/(1−δ)
= ε,
[
eδ
(1 + δ)
1+δ
]sX
AB/(1+δ)
= ε.
(13)
We notice that Eq. (13) is difficult to solve
when the observed values sXAB are large. In
this case, we adopt the simplified approx-
imation provided in [40] for sXAB ≥ −6 ln ε
(sXAB ≥ −6 ln ε). The simplified form can be
expressed as
δ =
√
(ln ε)2 − 8sXAB ln ε− 3 ln ε
2
(
sXAB + ln ε
) ,
δ =
√
(ln ε)2 − 8sXAB ln ε− 3 ln ε
2
(
sXAB + ln ε
) .
(14)
Here, we have obtained the upper bound
and lower bound of the expectation values
s∗,XAB with the observables s
X
AB. In order to ad-
dress the second issue, the following two steps
are involved. On the one hand, we utilize
Eq. (8) together with the two decoy states
method to acquire a tight upper bound of
the bit error rate EXµ in the X-basis. Com-
bining the decoy state method with s∗,XAB and
s∗,XAB , we can obtain the upper bound Yn,m and
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lower bound Yn,m of the yield when Alice and
Bob send out n and m photon states seper-
ately. The detailed derivation of the upper
and lower bounds of the yields Ynm is pro-
vided in Appendix C.
According to the estimation method pre-
sented in [17], the upper bound of the bit
error rate in the X-basis of the TF-QKD pro-
tocol can be given by
EXµ =

( ∞∑
n=0,m=0
K2n,2m
√
Y2n,2m
)2
+
( ∞∑
n=0,m=0
K2n+1,2m+1
√
Y2n+1,2m+1
)2NZ/sZ . (15)
Considering that we have employed the two decoy states method in our parameter estima-
tion, we can calculate the upper bound of EXµ by utilizing the upper bounds of the yields
estimated above and asymptotically replace the upper bounds of the other yields by 1. Then
we can rewrite Eq. (15) as
EXµ ≤ EXµ =[(K0,0
√
Y0,0 +K0,2
√
Y0,2 +K2,0
√
Y2,0 +
∞∑
n=1,m=1
K2n,2m)
2
+ (K1,1
√
Y1,1 +
∞∑
n=0,m=0
K2n+1,2m+1 −K1,1)2]NZ/sZ ,
(16)
where
K2n,2m = e
−µzµzn+m
/√
(2n)!(2m)!,
K2n+1,2m+1 = e
−µzµzn+m+1
/√
(2n+ 1)!(2m+ 1)!.
(17)
On the other hand, the phase error rate EZph cannot be simply replaced by the bit error
rate EXµ when the total signal pulses are limited. Considering the influence of statistical
fluctuations, we employ the random sampling without replacement method proposed in
[46] to provide a tighter bound for the phase error rate EZph. Based on an approximate
hypergeometric distribution formula, the upper bound of the phase error rate EZph can be
described as
EZph ≤ EXµ + γ(sX , sZ , EXµ , ε′′), (18)
with a failure probability ε′′, where
γ(sX , sZ , E
X
µ , ε
′′) =
√
(sX + sZ) (1 − EXµ )EXµ
sXsZ ln 2
log2
sX + sZ
sXsZε′′2EXµ (1− EXµ )
. (19)
C. Finite-key analysis with intensity
fluctuations
Apart from the finite-size effect, another
imperfection we cannot ignore in our real-life
implementation of TF-QKD is the intensity
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fluctuations of the photon sources. Consider-
ing that we have applied the two decoy states
method to our TF-QKD system, the intensity
fluctuations of both signal and decoy pulses
should be taken into account simultaneously.
In the case without intensity fluctuations, we
assume that the detection events are inde-
pendent. However, when the photon sources
are unstable, the intensity of an optical pulse
might correlate with other pulses if the eaves-
dropper Eve adopts coherent attacks. In this
case, the independent condition of the de-
tection events is not satisfied. To estimate
the secret key rate with intensity fluctuations
of the photon sources, we exploit Azuma’s
inequality [44, 45] to perform the finite-key
analysis with dependent samples.
According to our practical TF-QKD pro-
tocol, three different intensities are utilized
for the signal and decoy pulses. For simplic-
ity, we suppose that the intensity fluctuation
magnitudes of the signal pulses and the de-
coy pulses are equal and symmetric for Alice
and Bob
µz(1− δµ) = µz ≤ µz ≤ µz = µz(1 + δµ),
µi(1− δµ) = µi ≤ µi ≤ µi = µi(1 + δµ),
(20)
where µi is the intensity of the decoy pulse
with i ∈ {0, 1}, and δµ represents the fluctua-
tion magnitude of the intensities.
Here, Azuma’s inequality [44] is leveraged
to measure the upper bound and lower bound
of the expectation value of sXAB for dependent
events. Let n0A, n
1
A, . . . denotes a sequence of
random variables. Consider the following two
conditions:
(1) Martingale. The sequence is
called a martingale if and only if
it satisfies E
[
ni+1A |n0A, n1A, . . . , niA
]
= niA
for all non-negative integer i, where
E
[
ni+1A |n0A, n1A, . . . , niA
]
is the expectation
value of ni+1A conditioned on the first i + 1
outcomes of the sequence n0A, n
1
A, . . . , n
i
A.
(2) Bounded difference condition. The se-
quence satisfies the bounded difference con-
dition if there exists ci > 0 such that∣∣ni+1A − niA∣∣ ≤ ci for all non-negative integer i.
For a sequence n0A, n
1
A, . . . , n
N
A which con-
tains N + 1 trials and satisfies the above con-
ditions with ci = 1, nNA can be bounded by
Azuma’s inequality
Pr
[∣∣nNA − n0A∣∣ > Nδ] ≤ 2e−Nδ2/2 (21)
for δ ∈ (0, 1).
Then, let η0A, η
1
A, . . . , η
N
A be a set of N + 1
random but dependent variables that ηiA ∈
{0, 1}. We define the ith trial of the sequence
as
niA =


τ iA − τ∗,iA +η0A if i ≥ 1
η0A if i = 0
(22)
where τ iA =
i∑
j=1
ηjA is the observed value of
the set η1A, . . . , η
N
A with N dependent variables,
τ∗,iA =
i∑
j=1
P
(
ηjA|η0A, . . . , ηj−1A
)
is the expectation
value of the set η1A, . . . , η
N
A . We find that the
sequence defined by Eq. (21) is a Martingale
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and satisfies the bounded difference condition
with ci = 1. Hence, Azuma’s inequality can
be applied to the sequence. Then, the expec-
tation value τ∗,NA can be bounded by
Pr
[∣∣∣τNA − τ∗,NA ∣∣∣ > Nδ] ≤ 2e−Nδ2/2. (23)
Utilizing Azuma’s inequality, we can obtain
the upper bound and lower bound of the ex-
pectaion value τ∗,NA
τ∗,NA = τ
N
A + ∆ˆA,
τ∗,NA = τ
N
A −∆A.
(24)
with failure probabilities εˆA and εA, where
∆ˆA = gA (N, εˆA), ∆A = gA (N, εA) and gA (x, y) =√
2x ln (1/y). In our practical TF-QKD proto-
col, a set of N signal pulses can be regarded as
the set η1A, . . . , η
N
A , where η
i
A = 1 corresponding
to a successful detection event. In this way,
we can calculate s∗,XAB and s
∗,X
AB with the ob-
servables utilizing Azuma’s inequality.
In our parameter estimation, we only con-
sider the worst case through numerically min-
imizing the key rate over all the possible in-
tensity choices given by the fluctuation mag-
nitude. According to the bounds given above,
we can estimate the upper bound of the bit
error rate EXµ in the X-basis. With the same
method proposed in the previous subsection,
we can obtain the upper bound of EZph. The
length of the final secret key is determined by
solving Eq. (3).
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS\\
In this section, we simulate the perfor-
mance of the practical TF-QKD protocol
with finite key length and intensity fluctu-
ations. We calculate the secret key rate
against the overall loss (−10log10η) which is
measured in dB. Particularly, the overall loss
consists of the transmission loss of the opti-
cal channels and the detection efficiencies of
the two detectors. For simplicity, the inten-
sities of the decoy states are set to µ0 = 0.4
and µ1 = 10−5 with probabilities Pµ0 = 0.15
and Pµ1 = 1 − Pµ0 . We fix εsec = 10−10 and
εcor = 10
−12.
In our practical TF-QKD scheme, phase
misalignment does not affect the phase er-
ror rates due to the phase randomization of
the decoy pulses. Thus, the protocol is ro-
bust against small phase misalignments. In
this case, the polarization and phase mis-
alignments of the optical pulses after travel-
ing through the quantum channels are fixed
to 2% which is the same as the original prac-
tical TF-QKD protocol [36]. The successful
detection events sXAB, sZ and the bit error rate
in Z-basis EZµ are directly obtained by the
legitimate users after sifting step in real ex-
periments. Here, these observed values are
simulated by the linear channel loss model
provided in Appendix D.
In Fig. 1, we simulate the secret key
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Secret key rates in loga-
rithmic scale against the overall loss for N = 10x
with x = 12, 13, 14. The solid lines, dashed lines
and dotted lines relate to the cases when the dark
count rates Pd of the detectors are 10
−8, 10−7
and 10−6. The solid black line represents the
PLOB bound.
rate of the practical TF-QKD with finite-key
size using the multiplicative Chernoff bound.
Here, we demonstrate the performance of the
protocol with different amounts of total sig-
nals. As shown in Fig. 1, the protocol is ca-
pable enough to beat the PLOB bound with
a total photon number of 1012 even when the
dark count rate of the detectors is Pd = 10−7.
However, the finite-key effect is more signifi-
cant if the dark count rate is smaller.
To figure out the tightest analytical
bound of our practical TF-QKD protocol,
we compare the performances of Hoeffd-
ing’s inequality [37], the multiplicative Cher-
noff bound [39] and the improved Chernoff
bound [40]. As shown in Fig. 2, the re-
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Secret key rates against
the overall loss for variant security bounds with
different amount of total signal pulses. The
green, blue and red lines represents the param-
eter estimation utilizing Hoeffding’s inequality,
the multiplicative Chernoff bound and the im-
proved Chernoff bound. As a comparison, we
consider two different total numbers of signal
pulses N = 1013 (dashed lines) and N = 1014
(solid lines).
sults demonstrate that the secret key rate es-
timated by the improved Chernoff bound is
the tightest among three different methods.
However, the advantages are diminutive espe-
cially when the total number of signal pulses
is large.
In the case that the photon sources are
instable, we evaluate the secret key rate
with different intensity fluctuation magni-
tudes. Our simulation results indicate that
the influence of intensity fluctuations is non-
negligible in real-life implementations. Here,
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Secret key rates against
the overall loss for different fluctuation magni-
tudes of the intensities with instable sources.
The total number of signal pulses is fixed to
N = 1015. Accordingly, the curves from left to
right are obtained by employing different inten-
sity fluctuation magnitudes (δµ = 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3
separately).
the dark count rate is fixed to Pd = 10−8. Fig.
3 shows that if δµ is too large, the protocol
cannot beat the PLOB bound.
In order to evaluate the effect of the to-
tal amount of signal pulses in the presence
of intensity fluctuations, we estimate the se-
cret key rates with different number of total
signal pulses given a fixed δµ. The results
shown in Fig. 4 indicate that the effect of δµ
is extremely significant when the data sizes
of signal pulses are small.
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Secret key rates against
the overall loss for different data sizes of signal
pulses with the intensity fluctuation magnitude
δµ fixed to 0.1. the curves from left to right are
obtained for different data sizes (N = 10x with
x = 13, 14, 15, 16 separately).
V. CONCLUSION\\
In this article, we analyzed the perfor-
mance of the practical TF-QKD protocol
with finite-key effect and intensity fluctua-
tions. Based on the symmetrical assump-
tion of the system, we derived the secret key
length formula utilizing the universally com-
posable framework. An estimation of the
statistical fluctuations has been provided to
characterize the expected values of the suc-
cessful detection events in the X-basis with
the observed values obtained in the sifting
step. Particularly, comparing variant secu-
rity bounds, we find that the improved Cher-
noff bound is the tightest among Hoeffding’s
inequality, the multiplicative Chernoff bound
12
and the improved Chernoff bound. In addi-
tion, we exploit Azuma’s inequality to per-
form the finite-key analysis with intensity
fluctuations. We examined the secret key
rates for different total photon pulses and
fluctuation magnitudes separately. Accord-
ing to numerical simulation results, we are
convinced that the stability of the photon
source is essential to the performance of the
practical TF-QKD systems especially when
the data sizes are relatively smaller. In con-
clusion, our results of these practical issues
might provide an available reference for the
real-life implementation of the decoy-state
TF-QKD scheme.
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Appendix A: Secret key length
Here, the whole information Eve learned
about Alice’s raw key string ZA is summa-
rized by E′. By exploiting a random two
universal hash function, a εsec-secret key with
length l can be extracted from ZA
εsec = 2ε
′ +
1
2
√
2l−Hε
′
min
(ZA|E′), (A1)
where ε′ is the smoothing parameter,
Hε
′
min (ZA|E′) is the smooth min-entropy char-
acterizing the average probability of Eve cor-
rectly guessing ZA with the leaked informa-
tion E′ [47]. In the error correction step, a
maximum amount of leakEC + log2(1/εcor) bits
of the raw key are leaked to Eve. Accord-
ing to the chain rules [48], the smooth min-
entropy Hε
′
min (ZA|E′) can be obtained by
Hε
′
min (ZA|E′) ≥ Hε
′
min (ZA|E)− leakEC − log2
2
εcor
,
(A2)
where Hε
′
min (ZA|E) is the smooth min-entropy
after error correction. Based on the uncer-
tainty relation in [49], the lower bound of
Hε
′
min (ZA|E) is given by
Hε
′
min (ZA|E) ≥ sZ −Hε
′
min (Z
′
A|Z ′B)
≥ sZ
[
1− h
(
EZph
)] (A3)
Here, the upper bound of the phase error rate
EZph is determined by Eq. (18). The secret key
is εsec-secret for a length l
l =
[
Hε
′
min (ZA|E′)− 2log2
1
2ν
]
, (A4)
where ν = 12
√
2l−Hε
′
min
(ZA|E′). Hence, we obtain
the secrecy
εsec = 4 (ε+ ε) + 2ε
′ + ε′′ + ν + εPA. (A5)
In order to get the secrecy in our protocol,
the error terms are all fixed to a constant
ε′ = ε′′ = ν = ε = ε = εPA = ε1, (A6)
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thus εsec = 13ε1.
Appendix B: Statistical fluctuation
models
In the main text, we provide the finite-key
analysis with the improved Chernoff bound.
As a comparison, we utilize Hoeffding’s in-
equality [37] and the multiplicative Chernoff
bound [39] to acquire the tightest key rate
bound. Here, we follow the definitions given
in the main text. Let τ1, τ2, . . . , τn be a set of n
independent Bernoulli random variables that
τi ∈ {0, 1} and Pr (τi = 1) = Pi. Let τ =
∑n
i=1 τi
denote an observed outcome. The mean
value of the set is denoted as τ∗ =
∑n
i=1 Pi.
By applying Hoeffding’s inequality, the
upper bound and lower bound of the expec-
tation value τ∗ can be obtained by
τ∗ = τ + ∆ˆH ,
τ∗ = τ −∆H ,
(B1)
with failure probabilities εˆH and εH sepa-
rately, where ∆ˆH = gH (N, εˆH), ∆H = gH (N, εH)
and gH (x, y) =
√
x/2 ln (1/y).
In order to employ the multiplicative
Chernoff bound, we are supposed to calcu-
late the the lower bound of τ∗ with the Ho-
effding’s inequality with a failure probability
εH at first. Then we denote εC and εˆC as
the failure probabilities of the upper bound
and lower bound estimation of the Chernoff
bound. Consider the following conditions:
(1)
(
2εˆ−1C
)1/τ∗ ≤ e9/32. (2) εC−1/τ∗ < e1/3.
If both conditions are satisfied, the upper
bound and lower bound of the expectation
value τ∗ can be given by
τ∗ = τ + ∆ˆC ,
τ∗ = τ −∆C ,
(B2)
with failure probabilities εˆC and εC , where
∆ˆC = gC
(
τ, εˆ4C/16
)
, ∆C = gC
(
τ, εC
3/2
)
and
gC (x, y) =
√
2x ln (1/y). Because we have
employed the Hoeffding’s inequality to test
the two conditions, the overall failure proba-
bility that the expectation value τ∗ cannot
be bounded by the multiplicative Chernoff
bound is given by εH + εC + εˆC . In this way,
the expectation values estimated by variant
simulation models are different. By compar-
ing the performance of the final key rates, we
can define the tightest security bound in our
practical TF-QKD protocol.
Appendix C: Estimation of Ynm
In this section, we provide the derivation
of the upper bounds of Y0,0, Y2,0, Y0,2 and
Y1,1 utilized in Eq. (16) with the decoy-state
method proposed in [36]. In the main text,
we have obtained the upper bounds and lower
bounds of the expectation values s∗,XAB with
the observables sXAB. Together with Eq. (9),
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we have that
eµA+µBs∗,XAB
PAPBNX
≤
∑
n,m
µnAµ
m
B
n!m!
Ynm ≤ e
µA+µBs∗,XAB
PAPBNX
.
(C1)
We define T ∗,XAB := e
µA+µB (PAPBNX)
−1
s∗,XAB .
Then, Eq. (C1) can be rewritten as
T ∗,XAB ≤
∑
n,m
µnAµ
m
B
n!m!
Ynm ≤ T ∗,XAB , (C2)
where
T ∗,XAB = e
µA+µB (PAPBNX)
−1
s∗,XAB ,
T ∗,XAB = e
µA+µB (PAPBNX)
−1
s∗,XAB .
(C3)
Here, the decoy-state method proposed in
[37] can be directly applied to Eq. (C2). The
upper bound of Y1,1 can be obtained by
Y1,1 =
Γ1,1
(µ0 − µ1)2
, (C4)
where
Γ1,1 = T
∗,X
00 + T
∗,X
11 − T ∗,X01 − T ∗,X10 . (C5)
The upper bound of Y2,0 and Y0,2 are given by
Y2,0 =
2
[
(eµ0 − eµ1) (µ0 − µ1 + µ1eµ0 − µ0eµ1)− Γ2,0
]
(µ0 + µ1) (µ0 − µ1)2
,
Y0,2 =
2
[
(eµ0 − eµ1) (µ0 − µ1 + µ1eµ0 − µ0eµ1)− Γ0,2
]
(µ0 + µ1) (µ0 − µ1)2
,
(C6)
where
Γ2,0 = µ1T
∗,X
00 + µ0T
∗,X
11 − µ0T ∗,X01 − µ1T ∗,X10 ,
Γ0,2 = µ1T
∗,X
00 + µ0T
∗,X
11 − µ1T ∗,X01 − µ0T ∗,X10 .
(C7)
In order to obtain the upper bound of Y0,0, we need the lower bound of Y2,2 and the upper
bounds of Yn,0 and Y0,m.
The upper bounds of Yn,0 and Y0,m are given by
Yn,0 =
n!
[
(eµ0 − eµ1) (µ0 − µ1 + µ1eµ0 − µ0eµ1)− Γ2,0
]
(µ0 − µ1) (µn0 − µn1 )
,
Y0,m =
m!
[
(eµ0 − eµ1) (µ0 − µ1 + µ1eµ0 − µ0eµ1)− Γ0,2
]
(µ0 − µ1) (µm0 − µm1 )
.
(C8)
The lower bound of Y2,2 is given by
Y2,2 =
4
[
Γ1,1 − (eµ0 − eµ1)2
]
(µ20 − µ21)2
+ 1, (C9)
where
Γ1,1 = T
∗,X
00 + T
∗,X
11 − T ∗,X01 − T ∗,X10 . (C10)
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Then the upper bound of Y0,0 can be obtained by
Y0,0 =
Γ0,0
(µ0 − µ1)2
+
µ0µ1
[
12 (µ0 − µ1)
(
Y2,0 + Y0,2
)
+ 4
(
µ20 − µ21
) (
Y3,0 + Y0,3
)
+
(
µ30 − µ31
) (
Y4,0 + Y0,4
)]
24 (µ0 − µ1)
+
µ1
(
24eµ0 − µ40 − 4µ30 − 12µ20 − 24
)
12 (µ0 − µ1) −
µ0
(
24eµ1 − µ41 − 4µ31 − 12µ21 − 24
)
12 (µ0 − µ1) −
µ20µ
2
1Y2,2
4
,
(C11)
where
Γ0,0 = µ
2
1T
∗,X
00 + µ
2
0T
∗,X
11 − µ0µ1
(
T ∗,X01 + T
∗,X
10
)
. (C12)
The upper bound and lower bound of T ∗,XAB can be obtained by combining Eq. (C3) with the
observables sXAB.
Appendix D: Linear channel loss model
In order to perform our numerical simulation step, we adopt the linear channel loss model
presented in [36] with some modifications. The observed values which can be obtained in
real experiments are simulated below. The overall loss between Alice (Bob) and Charlie is
√
η
accounting for both channel loss and detection efficiencies of the two detectors (L and R). In
the original practical TF-QKD protocol [36], the gains and error rates are derived according
to which detector (L or R) clicks. Due to the symmetrical assumption of our system, we
find that the difference between the total successful detection events of two detectors are
negligible. Therefore, the total number of successful detection events when both parties
choose Z-basis at the same time is denoted as
sZ = NZ
[
(1− Pd)
(
e−
√
ηµZ cosα cosβ + e
√
ηµZ cosα cosβ
)
e−
√
ηµZ − 2(1− Pd)2e−2
√
ηµZ
]
, (D1)
where α and β are the polarization and phase misalignments of the signals from Alice and
Bob after travelling through the optical channel, NZ (NX) is the total number of pulses when
both parties choose the Z-basis (X-basis).
The successful detection events in the X-basis sXAB can be obtained by
sXAB = 2PµAPµBNX (1− Pd)
[
(Pd − 1) e−
√
η(µA+µB) + e−
√
η(µA+µB)/2I0 (
√
ηµAµB cosα)
]
, (D2)
where I0(x) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind.
The bit error rates in the Z-basis are given by
EZµ = NZ (1− Pd)
[
e
√
ηµZ cosα cosβ − (1− Pd) e−
√
ηµZ cosα cosβ
]
e−
√
ηµZ
/
sZ , (D3)
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